The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process by Ely Jr., James W.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary
1999
The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in
the Origins of Substantive Due Process
James W. Ely Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ely Jr., James W., "The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process" (1999). Constitutional
Commentary. 450.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/450
THE OXYMORON RECONSIDERED: MYTH 
AND REALITY IN THE ORIGINS OF 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
James W. Ely, Jr.* 
The view that the due process clauses of the Constitution 
impose substantive restraints on governmental power has long 
been a subject of contention. It has become an article of faith in 
some quarters that due process pertains entirely to matters of 
procedure. Thus, John Hart Ely maintained: "[W]e apparently 
need periodic reminding that 'substantive due process' is a con-
tradiction in terms-sort of like 'green pastel redness."'' Other 
observers have also derided substantive due process as an "oxy-
moron."2 Similarly, Robert H. Bork considers substantive due 
process to be "a momentous sham" that "has been used count-
less times since by jud:fes who want to write their personal be-
liefs into a document." 
Of course, substantive due process has not been so easily 
banished from the constitutional dialogue as these dismissive 
comments suggest. As historians are well aware, federal and 
state courts relied on a substantive interpretation of due process 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to vindicate eco-
nomic liberty.4 Following the political triumph of the New Deal, 
* Professor of Law and History, Vanderbilt University. I am grateful to David E. 
Bernstein, Rebecca Brown, Jon W. Bruce, John Goldberg and Nicholas Zeppos for their 
thoughtful commentary on earlier versions of this essay. I also wish to thank the partici-
pants in a faculty workshop at the George Mason University School of Law for helpful 
suggestions and criticisms. 
I. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 18 (Har-
vard U. Press, 1980). 
2. This phrase evidently originated in an opinion by Judge Richard A. Posner. See 
Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510,512 (7th Cir. 1982) (discussing "the ubiquitous oxymoron 
'substantive due process."' It has been widely employed in the scholarly literature. See, 
e.g., Nelson Lund, Federalism and Civil Liberties, 45 U. of Kansas L. Rev. 1045, 1059 
(1997) (stating that "substantive due process is not based on the text of the Constitution 
or the intentions of those who made it"). 
3. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 
31 (Free Press, 1990). 
4. James W. Ely, Jr., The Chief Justiceship of Melville W. Fuller, 1888-1910 at 83-
315 
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however, the Supreme Court abandoned meaningful due process 
review of economic and social legislation.5 Yet, far from disap-
pearing, substantive due process has been revamped in the late 
twentieth century to safeguard a variety of non-economic rights.6 
This dichotomy in the tY,Pe of rights accorded due process pro-
tection is highly suspect. It flies in the face of the language of 
the due process clauses as well as the views of the framers, and 
raises another set of issues. On what principled basis can one 
decide which rights are so basic as to warrant due process scru-
tiny? Some liberal scholars have endeavored to distinguish 
"bad" judicial solicitude for economic rights from "good" de-
fense of personal liberties.8 On the other hand, conservatives 
tend to reject outright most forms of substantive due process; 
this approach at least has the virtue of consistency. Justice An-
tonio Scalia, a critic of substantive due process in many policy 
areas, has sharply questioned the incoherent use of substantive 
due process to downgrade economic rights: 
The picking and choosing among various rights to be ac-
corded "substantive due process" protection is alone enough 
to arouse suspicion; but the categorical and inexplicable ex-
103 (U. of South Carolina Press, 1995); Bernard Schwartz, A History of the Supreme 
Coun 179-82 (Oxford U. Press, 1993); Kermit L. Hall, The Magic Mirror: Law in Ameri-
can History 232-36 (Oxford U. Press, 1989). 
5. James W. Ely, Jr., The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History 
of Propeny Rights 126-34 (Oxford U. Press, 2d ed. 1998); William E. Leuchtenburg, The 
Supreme Coun Reborn: The Constitutional Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt 213-36 
(Oxford U. Press, 1995). 
6. Schwartz, A History of the Supreme Coun at 337-61 (cited in note 4) (discussing 
the evolution of the right of privacy); William M. Wiecek, Libeny Under Law: The Su-
preme Court in American Life 177-93 (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1988); Laurence H. 
Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Consti-
tutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1223, 1297 (1995) (noting that due process 
clause continues "to provide not merely procedural protections, but substantive protec-
tions as well"). 
7. James W. Ely, Jr., The Enigmatic Place of Propeny Rights in Modern Constitu-
tional Thought, in David J. Bodenhamer and James W. Ely, Jr., eds., The Bill of Rights in 
Modern America: After 200 Years 89-91 (Indiana U. Press, 1993). See also Gottfried 
Dietze, In Defense of Propeny 60 (Regnery Co., 1963, reprinted U. Press of America, 
1995) (declaring that "property appears as an important right in the Constitution of the 
United States, a right that is definitely on a par with, if not superior to, other liberal 
rights"). Similarly, a prominent study of early state constitutions stated: "The first state 
constitutions thus clearly emphasized the individual's claim to legal protection of his 
property." Willi Paul Adams, The First American Constitutions: Republican Ideology and 
the Making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era 194 (U. of North Carolina 
Press, 1980). 
8. Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The Cri-
sis of Legal Onhodoxy 247-72 (Oxford U. Press, 1992). See also Morton J. Horwitz, The 
Jurisprudence of Brown and the Dilemmas of Liberalism, 14 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 
599 (1979). 
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elusion of so-called "economic rights" (even though the Due 
Process Clause explicitly applies to "property") unquestiona-
bly involved policyrnaking rather than neutral legal analysis.9 
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Still another group of scholars, spearheaded by Richard A. Ep-
stein and Bernard H. Siegan, has urged a renewed judicial com-
mitment to due process protection of economic rights. 10 
It is evident that thinking about the substantive dimension 
of the due process requirement has fragmented. All of the par-
ticipants in the debate, however, have one point in common-
they draw upon the sanction of history to support their position. 
Unfortunately, the grasp of the historical record displayed by 
many observers is skimpy. Indeed, a large number of the schol-
ars who address the concept of substantive due process seem 
more concerned with constructing a grand theory of constitu-
tional law than with carefully examining the past. 
Consider, for example, the analysis of the due process 
clauses provided by Bork. According to Bork, Dred Scott v. 
Sandford marked "the first appearance in American constitu-
tional law of the concept of 'substantive due process. "'11 This ac-
count is flawed in two signal respects. First, by linking a substan-
tive reading of due process to the discredited Dred Scott case 
Bork seeks to taint all subsequent applications of the doctrine. 
But due process received only passing attention by Chief Justice 
Roger B. Taney. Indeed, a leading historian has concluded that 
"Taney's contribution to the development of substantive due 
process was therefore meager and somewhat obscure."12 The 
problems with Dred Scott must be found elsewhere. The opinion 
does represent unbridled judicial activism. In Dred Scott the Su-
preme Court unnecessarily plunged into the heated debate over 
slavery in the federal territories by invalidating the Missouri 
9. United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 41 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring). See also 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. a. Rev. 85 (1983). This 
paper does not address Justice Scalia's opinion that the substantive component of due 
process protects only those specific rights recognized when the Bill of Rights was 
adopted. For Scalia's views, see generally David A. Schultz and Christopher E. Smith, 
The Jurisprudential Vision of Justice Antonin Scalia (Rowman & Littlefield, 1996). 
10. See generally Bernard H. Siegan, Economic Libenies and the Constitution (U. 
of Chicago Press, 1980); Richard A. Epstein, The Mistakes of 1937, 11 George Mason U. 
L. Rev. 5 (1988); Michael J. Phillips, Entry Restrictions in the Lochner Coun, 4 George 
Mason U. L. Rev. 405 (1996) (urging due process review of market entry restrictions); 
Note, Resurrecting Economic Rights: The Doctrine of Economic Due Process Reconsid-
ered,103 Harv. L. Rev. 1363-83 (1990). 
II. Bork, The Tempting of America at 31 (cited in note 3). 
12. Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scon Case: Its Significance in American Law 
and Politics 382 (Oxford U. Press, 1978). 
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Compromise. The decision triggered a political firestorm, hurt 
the prospects for a compromise solution, and undermined the 
prestige of the Court. The virus of Dred Scott, however, was not 
a substantive reading of due process but a failure of judicial 
statesmanship. Having resolved that blacks were not citizens, 
Taney could have disposed of the case on jurisdictional grounds 
and never addressed Scott's status as a slave. Second, Bork's 
explanation of substantive due process totally ignores the evolu-
tion of the doctrine in the antebellum state and federal courts. 
This omission skews his understanding of due process and illus-
trates the danger of concentrating solely on the Supreme Court 
in assessing the course of legal history. Bork is simply wrong in 
identifying Dred Scott as the fountainhead of substantive due 
process.13 
Other critics of substantive due process (even some conser-
vative jurists and scholars) rely on the long-outdated Progressive 
historiographical view of the courts at the turn of the century as. 
bastions of laissez-faire. The picture drawn by the Progressives, 
and historians who follow in their footsteps, too often veers into 
caricature.14 Put briefly, Progressive historiography holds that 
judges invented a substantive reading of the due process clauses 
during the post-Civil War period to safeguard the interests of 
business from legislative regulation.15 In so doing, judges frus-
trated the public will and substituted their own economic judg-
ments for those of elected lawmakers under the guise of enforc-
ing constitutional values. Despite a growing body of revisionist 
literature challenging the premise of the Progressive interpreta-
tion, the legacy of Progressive legal thought has proven re-
markably durable.16 
As might be expected, the Progressives took particular aim 
at substantive due process doctrines. They insisted that a sub-
stantive reading of the due process clauses subverted their origi-
13. Andrew Rutten, Bostan, Bork, and the Jurisprudence of Limited Government, 2 
Independent Review 271,277-79 (1997). 
14. The work of the Progressive historians was informed by a critical perspective 
toward the Constitution as an anti-democratic document as well as a desire to encourage 
social and economic change by lowering constitutional barriers to legislative reform. See 
Richard Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians (Alfred A. Knopf, 1968). According to 
Hofstadter, Progressives began to argue that "the courts must no longer be regarded as 
sacrosanct, and to try to find ways of curbing their power." Id. at 202. 
15. See Melvin I. Urofsky, A March of Libeny: A Constitutional History of the 
United States 496-502 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1988) (picturing the emergence of substantive 
due process as largely a development of the late nineteenth century). 
16. Horwitz, The Transformation of American lAw, 1870-1960 at 7 (cited in note 8). 
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nal meaning as simply a guarantee of procedural regularity. For 
instance, Louis B. Boudin advanced a narrow reading of due 
process. He maintained that the concept of due process initially 
operated as a restraint on the executive and judicial branches but 
did not limit legislative authority. Further, Boudin asserted that 
the due process requirement pertained only to matters of proce-
dure.17 EdwardS. Corwin likewise declared: "All that 'due proc-
ess of law' meant originally was a fair trial for accused per-
sons .... "18 Under this analysis, of course, due process would 
not amount to much as a limit on governmental authority. 
In this paper I propose to take a fresh look at the origins of 
substantive due process and to offer ail alternative interpretation 
of the due process norm. I investigate the evolution of the con-
cept of due process as a restraint on government in American ju-
risprudence before the Civil War. Moreover, I argue that due 
process was fashioned in part to protect the rights of property 
owners, and that judicial decisions placing property in a subordi-
nate constitutional category are historically unsound. 
One should start this analysis by questioning common ter-
minology. It bears emphasis that the phrase "substantive due 
process" is anachronistic when used to describe decisions ren-
dered during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In-
deed, courts did not differentiate between procedural and sub-
stantive due process until the New Deal era. 19 The unitary 
understanding of due process shattered in the late 1930s, but no 
Supreme Court ~stice employed the term "substantive due pro-
cess" until 1948. Although I employ the term in this paper for 
convenience, I recognize that it is misleading and betrays a ten-
dency to read history backward. 
17. Louis B. Boudin, 2 Government by Judiciary? 374-96 (William Godwin, Inc., 
1932). 
18. Edward S. Corwin, Coun Over Constitution 107 (Princeton U. Press, 1938). 
The leading study of constitutional history has adopted this viewpoint. Alfred H. Kelly, 
Winfred A. Harbison, and Herman Belz, 2 The American Constitution: Its Origins and 
Development 387-88 (W.W. Norton, 7th ed. 1991) (stating that historically the due proc-
ess guarantee referred to "procedures that protected persons against arbitrary punish-
ment"). 
19. Wayne McCormack, Economic Substantive Due Process and the Right to Liveli-
hood, 82 Ky. L.J. 397, 404 (1993-1994) ("No recognized distinction between procedural 
and substantive due process existed until after the New Deal eliminated the substantive 
protections."). 
20. Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 90 (1948) (Rutledge, J., 
dissenting). 
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MAGNA CARTA 
Scholars agree that the federal and state due process clauses 
are derived from the Magna Carta granted by King John under 
duress to rebellious nobles in 1215. Chapter 39 of the Magna 
Carta provides: 
No free man shall be taken, imprisoned, disseised, out-
lawed, banished, or in any way destroyed, nor will We pro-
ceed against or prosecute him, except by lawful judgment of 
his peers and by the law of the land.2 
This chapter was designed as a guarantee against arbitrary ac-
tions by the king.22 The clause was directed against royal 
authority for an obvious reason. The modem distinction be-
tween legislative and executive aspects of government had not 
yet emerged. In 1215 there was no Parliament or other legisla-
tive bodt in England, and the king exercised the law-making 
function. Disagreements about the substantive dimensions of 
due process center on the meaning of the "law of the land" 
clause. Although a matter of some dispute among historians of 
early England, the expression "law of the land" is sufficiently 
comprehensive to include substantive law as well as procedural 
safeguards.24 It was an effort to reassert customary law in the 
place of arbitrary royal command.25 
Magna Carta was repeatedly reissued in later years and con-
firmed by King John's successors. A 1354 statute by Parliament 
first used the phrase "due process of law" in interpreting Chap-
ter 39.26 The historical debate over the meaning originally as-
signed to the terms "law of the land" and "due process of law" is 
beyond the scope of this paper. It should be stressed, however, 
21. A.E. Dick Howard, Magna Carta Text and Commentary 43 (U. Press of Vir-
ginia, 1964). 
22. A.E. Dick Howard, The Road from Runnymede: Magna Carta and Constitu-
tionalism in America 6-1 (U. Press of Virginia, 1968). See generally J. C. Holt, The 
Making of Magna Carta (U. Press of Virginia, 1965). 
23. Rodney L. Molt, Due Process of Law 42-44 (Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1926). 
24. ld. at 74-86. See also Dietze, In Defense of Property at 54 (cited in note 7) (" ... 
Magna Carta abounds with statements securing property rights."); Edward Keynes, Lib-
erty, Property, and Privacy: Toward a Jurisprudence of Substantive Due Process 11 (Penn. 
State U. Press, 1996) ("Beginning with the Magna Carta, therefore, the substantive law 
imposed limits on the king's power to deprive a freeman [of] life, liberty and property."). 
25. Charles H. Mcilwain, Due Process of Laty in Magna Carta, 14 Colum. L. Rev. 
27,49-51 (1914) (asserting that the "law of the land" clause intended to restore substan-
tive customary law). 
26. Faith Thompson, Magna Carta: Its Role in the Making of the English Constitu-
tion, 1300-1629 at 86-93 (U. of Minnesota Press,1948). 
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that there is early support for the view that these expressions 
were 1) essentially synonymous, and 2) embraced a substantive 
as well as a procedural component.27 
Although Magna Carta remained a symbol of the rule of 
law, it did not loom large in English law during the Tudor pe-
riod. Sir Edward Coke played a vital role in the seventeenth 
century revival of Magna Carta as a means to check the Stuart 
monarchs. Since Coke's writing was highly influential in colonial 
America, his interpretation of Chapter 39 warrants special atten-
tion. Coke first maintained that "law of the land" and "due pro-
cess of law" had the same meaning. More important for our 
purpose, Coke implied that the "law of the land" constituted a 
substantive limitation on· the power of government. Much of 
Coke's analysis of Chapter 39 dealt with procedural safeguards, 
but he also discussed substantive restraints.28 For instance, Coke 
observed that "monopolies are against this great charter, be-
cause they are against the libert:zr and freedome of the subject, 
and against the law of the land." Clearly, then, Coke's concep-
tion of the "law of the land" was not confined to procedural mat-
ters. Whether Coke correctly interpreted Chapter 39 is a matter 
of historical debate, but the crucial point is that his views were 
widely accepted as authoritative and markedly influenced consti-
tutional development in the American colonies.30 As John 
Phillip Reid explained: "What was important about Magna 
Carta in the eighteenth century was not what it said but what it 
had come to mean. "31 
27. William Holdsworth, 1 A History of English Law60-63 (4th ed. 1927); Keynes, 
Liberty, Property, and Privacy at 11-12 (cited in note 24); Frank R. Strong, SubsUUitive 
Due Process of Law: A Dichotomy of Sense and Nonsense 5-7 (Carolina Academic Press, 
1986). But see Keith Jurow, Untimely Thoughts: A Reconsideration of the Origins of Due 
Process of Law, 19 Am. J. of Leg. Hist. 265 (1975) (arguing that "the law of the land" and 
"due process of law" were not equivalent expressions, and that due process did not play 
an important role in the development of English law). 
28. Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 Wise. L. Rev. 941,958-
960. 
29. Edward Coke, I Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 47 (E. and 
R. Brooke, 1797). See generally Strong, SubsUUitive Due Process at 15-18 (cited in note 
27). 
30. Mott, Due Process of Law at 88-90 (cited in note 23); Howard, The Road from 
Runnymede at 118-25 (cited in note 22); W.J. Brockelbank, The Role of Due Process in 
American Constitutional Law, 39 Cornell L. Rev. 561,562 (1954). 
31. John Phillip Reid, Constitutional History of the American Revolution: The 
Authority to Legislate 178 (U. of Wisconsin Press, 1991 ). 
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COLONIAL BACKGROUND 
The colonists in the seventeenth century looked to Magna 
Carta as a protection of their liberties, and often enacted some 
version of Chapter 39 into their laws. A 1639 Maryland Act de-
clared that inhabitants "shall have all their ri~hts and liberties 
according to the great Charter of England." 2 Likewise, the 
Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts (1648) stated that "no mans 
goods or estate shall be taken away from him ... unless it be b~ 
the vertue or equity of some expresse law of the Country." 3 
Other colonies followed suit, adopting some variation of the 
"law of the land" clause as part of their fundamental law. This is 
not to suggest that the colonists had any common understanding 
as to the precise nature of the rights protected by such language. 
As Rodney L. Mott noted: 
It is evident that the colonists looked upon due process of law 
as a guarantee which had a wide, varied, and indefinite con-
tent. At no time was there any serious attempt to define it, 
and it is noteworthy that they should seize upon these par-
ticular words under such diverse circumstances . . . but it is 
certain that many of them realized that it had a much wider 
import than merely guaranteeing proper procedure in crimi-
nal cases. 34 
Indeed, from time to time colonists relied on "law of the land" 
arguments in an attempt to restrain royal governors and local as-
semblies. By the start of the Revolutionary era, the colonists 
pressed the argument that Magna Carta represented a statement 
of fundamental rights that even Parliament could not abridge.35 
William Blackstone, writing on the eve of the American 
Revolution, did much to amplify thinking about the "law of the 
land" provision. He discussed this language in terms of both 
procedure and substance. More particularly, Blackstone linked 
Chapter 39 with substantive protection of the rights of property 
owners. He observed: 
32. As quoted in Howard, The Road from Runnymede at 54 (cited in note 22). See 
generally Joseph H. Smith, The Foundations of Law in Maryland, 1634-1715, in George 
A. Billias, ed., Law and Authority in Colonial America 92-108 (Barre Publishers, 1965). 
33. The Book of the General Lawes and Libertyes Concerning the Inhabitants of the 
Massachusetts, Reprint of the 1648 Edition in the Huntington Library 1 (Harvard U. 
Press, 1929). 
34. Mott, Due Process of Law at 123 (cited in note 23). 
35. Riggs, 1990 Wise. L. Rev. at 969-71 (cited in note 28). 
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The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that 
of property: which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and 
disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminu-
tion, save only by the laws of the land. The original of private 
property is probably founded in nature, as will be more fully 
explained in the second book of the ensuing commentaries: 
but certainly the modifications under which we at present find 
it, the method of conserving it in the present owner, and of 
translating it from man to man, are entirely derived from so-
ciety; and are some of those civil advantages, in exchange for 
which every individual has resigned a part of his natural lib-
erty. The laws of England are therefore, in point of honor 
and justice, extremely watchful in ascertaining and protecting 
this right. Upon this principle the great charter has declared 
that no freeman shall be disseised, or divested, of his freehold, 
or of his liberties, or free customs, but by the judgment of his 
36 peers, or by the law of the land. 
323 
By way of explanation, Blackstone then stated that either taking 
private property for public use without payment of compensa-
tion or taxation without consent would violate the "law of the 
land. "37 Obviously these examples go well beyond procedural 
requirements, and represent substantive limits on the power of 
government. "To the extent that Blackstone's Commentaries in-
fluenced legal and political thought in America," Robert E. 
Riggs has aptly commented, "it would have encouraged a broad 
reading of the concept. "38 
Additionally, it bears emphasis that when Blackstone wrote, 
Parliamentary sovereignty had been recently established in 
England. If Magna Carta was treated solely as a restriction on 
the royal prerogative, it would necessarily lose much modem 
significance. Although Blackstone spoke in terms of the abso-
lute power of Parliament, his analysis of the fundamental rights 
secured by the "law of the land" only makes sense if binding on 
Parliament.39 Whatever the ambiguities of the situation in Eng-
land, moreover, by the Revolutionary era the American colo-
36. William Blackstone, I Commentaries on the Laws of England I34 (London, 
I765-I769, reprinted U. of Chicago Press,I979). 
37. Id. at 135-36. 
38. Riggs, I990 Wise. L. Rev. at 972 (cited in note 28). 
39. Blackstone's stress on the absolute power of Parliament is seemingly in poten-
tial conflict with his discussion of individual rights. Blackstone, I Commentaries at I 56 
(cited in note 36) ("(Parliament] can, in short, do every thing that is not naturally impos-
sible .... True it is, that what they do, no authority upon earth can undo."). Blackstone 
may not, however, have been fully consistent. He also declared that statutes contrary to 
the law of nature were invalid. ld. at 40-41. 
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nists were fashioning constitutional theories to limit Parliament. 
Reid's analysis is instructive: 
For Sir Edward Coke and his fellow members of the Com-
mons of 1628, property and security were both defined in 
terms of what the king constitutionally could not do. For the 
Americans of a century and a half later, property and liberty 
were defined in terms of what Parliament constitutionally 
could not do. 40 
The newly independent Americans emphatically rejected 
the English notion of legislative supremacy in favor of a limited 
government. They adhered to the older tradition, exemplified 
by Magna Carta, that legitimate government was restrained by 
respect for fundamental rights. Reflecting this heritage, the Bill 
of Rights, including the due process clause, was clearly intended 
to bind the legislative branch.41 Discussing the rights of indi-
viduals, Madison revealingly stated in 1800: "The legislature, no 
less than the executive, is under limitations of power .... 
Hence, in the United States, the great and essential rights of the 
people are secured against legislative as well as executive ambi-
tion."42 Despite this record, some scholars continue to insist that 
due process properly has no application to legislative action!3 In 
contrast, I contend that the archaic English understanding of 
Magna Carta as a restraint on only the Crown was abandoned in 
colonial America before the Revolution, and fails to prove that 
due process was not binding on legislatures in the American con-
stitutional framework. 
Given the high standing of the principles set forth in Magna 
Carta during the Revolutionary debates, it was hardly a surprise 
that language derived from Chapter 39 was incorporated into 
most of the initial state constitutions. To be sure, there was a 
wide range of phrasing in the different constitutions. Yet several 
states, including Massachusetts, Maryland, and North Carolina, 
ad~ted wording that closely approximated the text of Chapter 
39. A protection against deprivation of liberty or property ex-
40. John Phillip Reid, Constitutional History of the American Revolution: The 
Authority of Rights 45 (U. of Wisconsin Press, 1986). 
41. Douglas Laycock, Due Process and Separation of Powers: The Effort to Make 
the Due Process Clauses Nonjusticiable, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 875, 892 (1982) ("The great in-
novation of American bills of rights was that they restrained legislative power, and there 
is no reason to believe that due process clauses were not part of that innovation."). 
42. As quoted in Riggs, 1990 Wise. L. Rev. at 1001 n.280 (cited in note 28). 
43. Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformolion of the Fourteenth 
Amendment 193-200 (Harvard U. Press, 1977). 
44. See, e.g., Maryland Declaration of Rights, art. XXI (1 n6); North Carolina 
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cept by the "law of the land" also appeared in the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787, included among a number of substantive and 
procedural guarantees for inhabitants of the Northwest Terri-
4s tory. 
James Madison, of course, selected the phrase "due process 
of law" in drafting the Fifth Amendment. The reasons for Madi-
son's change in wording are unclear, 46 but one scholar has sug-
gested that he chose due process language to secure "more en-
compassing protection of personal liberty."47 The history of 
framing and debating the Bill of Rights is remarkably skimpy, 
and a good deal must rest upon historical conjecture. Since the 
view that "due process of law" and "law of the land" had the 
same meaning was broadly shared, it seems unlikely that Madi-
son envisioned any departure from the general understanding of 
this concept. Indeed, in drafting the Bill of Rights Madison har-
bored no plan to fashion new rights or depart from settled 
norms. He intended to formulate a document which reflected a 
consensus about widely held values. As Madison explained to 
Thomas Jefferson, "Every thing of a controvertible nature that 
might endanger the concurrence of two-thirds of each House 
and three-fourths of the States was studiously avoided."48 It thus 
seems appropriate to conclude that Madison used "due process 
of law" in light of its historical association with the substantive 
dimensions of the "law of the land" clause. 
In unpacking the notion of due process, it is important to 
consider one piece of evidence often cited for the proposition 
that due process was confined to judicial procedure. A number 
of scholars have pointed to Alexander Hamilton's February 6, 
1787 remarks to the New York Assembly as demonstrating the 
contemporary understanding of due process.49 The legislature 
was considering a bill to prevent privateers from holding any 
Declaration of Rights, art. XII (1776); Massachusetts Declaration of Right, art. XII 
(1780). 
45. Riggs, 1990 Wise. L. Rev. at 976 (cited in note 28); Keynes, Liberty, Property, 
and Privacy at 15·16 (cited in note 24). See also Reed v. Wright, 2 G. Greene 15, 21-23 
(Iowa 1849) (discussing Northwest Ordinance's "law of the land" clause in terms of 
Magna Carta). 
46. Riggs, 1990 Wise. L. Rev. at 991 (cited in note 28). 
47. Stuart Leibiger, James Madison and Amendments to the Constitution, 1787-1789: 
'Parchment Barriers', 59 J. of Southern History 441,461 (1993). 
48. Robert A. Rutland and Charles F. Hobson, eds., 12 Papers of James Madison 
272 (U. Press of Virginia, 1979). 
49. Easterbrook, 1982 Sup. Ct. Rev. at 98 n.35 (cited in note 9); Berger, Govern-
ment by Judiciary at 196 (cited in note 43). 
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public office. Speaking in opposition to the measure, Hamilton 
observed: 
In one article of [the New York Constitution], it is said no 
man shall be disfranchised or deprived of any right he enjoys 
under the constitution, but by the law of the land, or the 
judgment of his peers. Some gentlemen hold that the law of 
the land will include an act of the legislature. But Lord Coke, 
that great luminary of the law, in his comment upon a similar 
clause, in Magna Charta, interprets the law of the land to 
mean presentment and indictment, and process of outlawry, 
as contradistinguished from trial by jury. But if there were 
any doubt upon the constitution, the bill of rights enacted in 
this very session removes it. It is there declared that, no man 
shall be disfranchised or deprived of any right, but by due 
process of law, or the judgment of his peers. The words "due 
process" have a precise technical import, and are only appli-
cable to the process and proceedings of the courts of justice; 
they can never be referred to an act of legislature. 
Are we willing then to endure the inconsistency of passing a 
bill of rights, and committing a direct violation of it in the 
same session? In short, are we ready to destroy its founda-
tions at the moment they are laid?50 
Upon a quick reading Hamilton appears to treat due process as 
simply a matter of procedure. But there is room to doubt that 
these comments by Hamilton support the conclusions that due 
process was so limited. 
First, it is unlikely that a single statement, made in the 
course of a legislative debate, provides an adequate basis for 
broad generalizations about Hamilton's thinking, much less for 
conclusions about the dominant opinion of the founding genera-
tion. Second, and more telling, Hamilton's statement intimates 
that the proposed legislation would in fact violate due process. 
In other words, Hamilton is asserting that due process limits the 
power of the legislature to deprive former privateers of their 
rights. His speech thus lends support for the view that due proc-
ess placed substantive restraints on legislative power.5' 
Given the paucity of debate over the Bill of Rights and the 
meaning of due process in the 1790s, historical inquiry cannot 
50. Harold C. Syrett, ed., 4 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 35-36 (Columbia U. 
Press, 1962). 
51. Laycock, 60 Tex. L. Rev. at 890-91 (cited in note 41); Riggs, 1990 Wise. L. Rev. 
at 989-90 (cited in note 28). 
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reveal with certainty the scope of the due process clause in the 
minds of the framers and ratifiers. Nonetheless, I fail to see how 
American statesmen accustomed to viewing due process through 
the lens of Coke and Blackstone could have failed to understand 
due process as encompassing substantive as well as procedural 
terms. To my mind, the most persuasive hypothesis holds 1) that 
the language "law of the land" or "due process of law" connoted 
substantive guarantees of fundamental rights against govern-
ment, and 2) that due process rights in the American constitu-
tional context applied against the legislative branch.52 
Of course, actual practice should tell us more about due 
process than theorizing from meager historical evidence. A study 
of how American courts in the early republic treated due process 
claims offers an opportunity to test my hypothesis. We should 
then consider how American courts interpreted due process in 
the period before the Civil War. 
DUE PROCESS IN ANTEBELLUM JURISPRUDENCE 
My goal in this section is to trace the evolution of the due 
process norm as a limit on legislative power in the antebellum 
era. Although I will discuss a few federal court decisions, the fo-
cus will be on state constitutional law. Before the Civil War, the 
understanding of due process developed more fully in the state 
courts because they heard a larger number of cases which raised 
the issue. 
The work of Edward S. Corwin has long influenced the his-
torical understanding of due process in the antebellum period.53 
Indeed, Corwin is often cited for the proposition that due proc-
ess did not place any restriction on legislative power.54 In large 
part because of Corwin's efforts, the antebellum heritage of due 
process as a guarantee of substantive rights has been almost 
erased from American constitutional history. Yet I argue that 
Corwin's scholarship will not stand the scrutiny of critical ex-
52. The Supreme Court affirmed that due process "is a restraint on the legislative 
as well as on the executive and judicial powers of the government ... " in Murray's Lessee 
v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272,276 (1855). 
53. Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 
24 Harv. L. Rev. 366-85, 460-79 (1911). For a similar analysis of antebellum due process 
see Lowell J. Howe, The Meaning of' Due Process of Law' Prior to the Adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 18 California L. Rev. 583 (1930). 
54. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 189-90 n.13 (cited in note 1); Boudin, 
2 Government By Judiciary at 376-77 (cited in note 17); Easterbrook, 1982 Sup. Ct. Rev. 
at 95 n.27 (cited in note 9). 
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amination. Writing in 1911, Corwin downplayed due process be-
cause judicial protection of the rights of property owners did not 
fit with the Progressive ideology favoring governmental regula-
tion of the economy.55 Hence, Corwin strived to place a narrow 
construction on state court cases interpreting law of the land or 
due process clauses, and to dismiss decisions invoking substan-
tive due process as anomalous.56 
In analyzing the growth of substantive due process, it is 
helpful to keep two points in mind. First, the concept of judicial 
review in antebellum America was in an embryonic stage and a 
subject of controversy. As a result, judicial review was used 
sparingly by courts before the Civil War.57 Second, both state 
and federal courts took the position that law of the land clauses 
in state constitutions were synonymous with due process. In its 
initial interpretation of the due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court declared that "[t]he words, 
'due process of law,' were undoubtedly intended to convey the 
same meaning as the words, 'by the law of the land,' in Magna 
Carta."58 Numerous state decisions, as well as leading commen-
tators such as James Kent, expressed the same view.59 
Courts in North Carolina were the first to give sustained at-
tention to the meaning of due process. As early as 1794 the Su-
perior Court was called upon to construe the law of the land 
clause in the North Carolina Constitution.60 At issue was the va-
lidity of a statute authorizing the Attorney General to take 
judgments against receivers of public money for delinquent 
55. For the Progressive confidence in regulatory solutions, see Hall, The Magic 
Mirror at 196-97 (cited in note 4); William G. Ross, A Muted Fury: Populists, Progres-
sives, and Labor Unions Confront the Courts, 1890-1937 at 14, 106-09 (Princeton U. 
Press,1994); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Mind and Heart of Progressive Legal Thought, 81 
Iowa L.Rev. 149-60 (1995). 
56. See Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the 
Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 L. & Hist. Rev. 293, 325 n.135 
(1985) (observing that "Corwin dismisses far too casually the degree to which antebellum 
lawyers and jurists had come to accept what we would recognize as a 'substantive' notion 
of due process."); Glen 0. Robinson, Evolving Conceptions of' Property' And 'Liberty' in 
Due Process Jurisprudence, in Ellen Frankel Paul and Howard Dickman, eds., Liberty, 
Property, and Government: Constitutional Interpretation Before the New Deal 84 (State 
U. of New York Press, 1989) (noting that Corwin's "more general inference that state 
courts repudiated the use of due process clauses to impose subsiiUIIive restraints on leg-
islation is not supported by a careful reading of the cases."). 
57. See Don E. Fehrenbacher, Constitutions and Constitutionalism in the Slave-
holding South 20-22 (U. of Georgia Press, 1989). 
58. Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. at 276. 
59. James Kent, 2 Commentaries on American Law 10 (0. Halsted, 1827). E.g., 
Rhinehart v. Schuyler, ?Ill. 473,519 (1845); Brown v. Hummel, 6 Pa. 86,91 (1847). 
60. State v. __ ,1 Haywood 38 (N.C. 1794). 
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payments without giving notice. Judge John Williams declared 
the act to be unconstitutional. He reasoned that the law of the 
land clause meant "according to the course of the common 
law."61 Since the common law required notice and an opportu-
nity for the defendant to offer a defense, the legislature was not 
at liberty to substitute a summary proceeding. Attorney General 
John Haywood, however, insisted that the law of the land clause 
did not restrain the legislature, and simply required "a law for 
the people of North Carolina, made or adogted by themselves by 
the intervention of their own Legislature." Haywood expressed 
concern that to interpret the clause to incorporate common law 
principles would contradict the spirit of republican government 
and hamper legislative authority to change the law. This argu-
ment framed the basic question: Does every piece of properly 
enacted legislation satisfy the law of the land requirement? 
Judge Williams lost the first round, when a divided bench upheld 
the act following re-argument. 
Yet only a few years later the highest court in North Caro-
lina accepted Williams's contention and recognized that the law 
of the land clause placed substantive limits on law-making. In 
1789 the legislature granted all property "that has heretofore, or 
shall hereafter escheat" to the trustees of the University of 
North Carolina. Thereafter the legislature repealed this meas-
ure and directed that all escheated property which the trustees 
had not already sold should revert to the state. In the leading 
case of Trustees of the University of North Carolina v. Foy and 
Bishop,63 the trustees brought an action of ejectment to recover 
possession of a tract of land which escheated before enactment 
of the repeal act. The case turned upon whether the trustees 
were constitutionally divested of title by the later statute. The 
court brushed aside the argument that the law of the land did not 
impose any restrictions on the legislature. Next, the court de-
fined the scope of the clause as applied to the present contro-
versy: 
It seems to us to warrant a belief that members of a corpora-
tion as well as individuals shall not be so deprived of their lib-
erties or property, unless by a trial by Jury in a court of Jus-
tice, according to the known and established rules of decision, 
derived from the common law, and such acts of the Legisla-
61. Id. at 39. 
62. Id. at 43. 
63. 5 N.C. 58 (1805). 
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ture as are consistent with the constitution-and although the 
Trustees are a corporation established for public purposes, yet 
their property is as completely beyond the control of the 
Legislature, as the property of individuals or that of any other 
• 64 
corporatiOn. 
Note that the Court blended substantive and procedural ele-
ments in concluding that the legislature could not at its pleasure 
revoke grants of land already vested in the trustees. In addition 
to requiring a trial by jury, the law of the land clause was inter-
preted to establish common law principles as a constitutional 
norm which confined legislative authority. Thus, in Fay and 
Bishop the law of the land clause was read to invalidate legisla-
tion which alienated property from one person or group of per-
sons to another. 
This line of North Carolina cases reached a culmination in 
Hoke v. Henderson.65 The case arose when the legislature al-
tered the mode of selecting court clerks. Under laws of 1777 and 
1806 judges appointed the clerks, who held office during good 
behavior. In 1832 lawmakers provided that clerks of court 
should be elected by popular vote for a term of four years. The 
effect of the statute was to displace the existing clerks. Plaintiff 
Hoke asserted that he was entitled to the office of clerk by virtue 
of election, but his claim was contested by the incumbent clerk. 
Rejecting the plaintiffs contention, the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina, in a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Thomas Ruf-
fin, held that the 1832 act unconstitutionally deprived the in-
cumbent clerk of a property interest in his public office. Ruffin 
concluded that a law which transferred the property right of one 
person to another, or which punished persons without trial, had 
simply the form of law and was not "one of those laws of the 
land, by which alone a freeman can be deprived of his prop-
erty."66 He clearly treated the law of the land clause as a restric-
tion on legislative authority. Indeed, Ruffin opined that "public 
liberty requires that private .property should be protected even 
from the government itself. "6 
64. !d. at 88. A similar result pertained in Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 
50-51 (1815), a case which arose out of Virginia's effort to confiscate certain property 
held by the Episcopal Church. The Supreme Court invalidated the divestment statutes as 
"utterly inconsistent with a great and fundamental principle of a republican government, 
the right of the citizens to the free enjoyment of their property legally acquired." 
65. 15 N.C. 1 (1833). 
66. Id. at 15 (emphasis in original). 
67. Id. at 12. 
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As the view that due process entailed some legal norms be-
yond the reach of the legislature gained ground with American 
courts, judges began to grapple with the extent to which due 
process safeguarded the liberty and property interests of indi-
viduals. Courts early proscribed legislation which had the effect 
of divesting an owner of proJ'erty and transferring it to another. 
In Bowman v. Middleton, for instance, the South Carolina 
Court of Common Pleas passed upon the validity of an 1712 act 
which resolved a title dispute arising from overlapping land 
grants. The statute confirmed the title of the heirs of the second 
grantee, effectively transferring ownership of the tract in ques-
tion. Although the measure was enacted long before South 
Carolina became independent and adopted a state constitution, 
the court struck down the legislation. In so doing the Court ob-
served: 
[T]he plaintiffs could claim no title under the act in question, 
as it was against common right, as well as against magna 
charta, to take away the freehold of one man and vest it in 
another, and that, too, to the prejudice of third persons, with-
out any compensation, or even a trial by the jury of the coun-
try, to determine the right in question. That the act was, 
therefore, ipso facto, void.69 
Even in the absence of express constitutional language, the 
Court applied principles derived from Magna Carta to limit the 
power of the legislature to interfere with property ownership. 
Similarly, the Tennessee Supreme Court of Errors and Ap-
peals, interpreting the law of the land provision in the state con-
stitution, commented: 
Property in possession by this clause is secured to the owner, 
so that it cannot be taken from him but by due course of law 
in a court regularly constituted and proceeding by the stand-
ing rules of law; not by act of Assembly, de~riving the owner 
of it for the benefit of some other individual. 0 
The same principle was adopted in Taylor v. Porter.71 Un-
der a New York statute the Town of Milton highway commis-
sioners authorized the defendants to lay out a private road 
through the plaintiffs land to reach the public highway. AI-
68. 1 Bay 252 (S.C. 1792). 
69. ld. at 254-55. 
70. Townsend v. Townsend, 7 Tenn. 1, 17 (1821). 
71. 4 Hill140 (N.Y. 1843). 
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though the statute provided for compensation, the plaintiff 
brought an action for trespass. The Supreme Court of New 
York invalidated the statute as a deprivation of property in con-
travention of the law of the land and due process clauses in the 
New York Constitution of 1821. Explaining that liberty and 
property were at the heart of the social order, the Court ex-
plained: "The words 'by the law of the land' ... do not mean a 
statute passed for the purpose of working the wrong. That con-
struction would render the restriction absolutely nugatory .... ,n 
Both that language and the due process clause necessitated a ju-
dicial determination that an owner had either forfeited title or 
that someone had superior title as a prerequisite to a change in 
ownership. Lawmakers, the court added, could no more transfer 
the property of one person to another than they could put an in-
dividual in prison "by mere legislation." In short, the court 
raised a barrier to legislative divestiture of ownership in favor of 
other individuals, even with compensation. 
A similar measure authorizing the establishment of private 
roads was struck down by the Supreme Court of Alabama in 
Sadler v. Langham.13 Although the court relied primarily on the 
public use doctrine as a restraint on eminent domain, it signifi-
cantly observed: "Without intending, at this time, to define the 
full meaning of the constitutional phrase, due course of law, it 
evidently does not mean a transfer of ~roperty by mere legisla-
tive edict, from one person to another." 4 
As these cases demonstrate, the due process requirement 
prevented legislative interference with individual titles to land.75 
This principle found expression in the frequently repeated 
maxim that statutes taking the property of A and transferring it 
to B constituted a deprivation of property without due process.76 
72. ld. at 145. 
73. 34 Ala. 311 (1859). 
74. ld. at 329. 
75. The thesis that due process protected liberty and property against arbitrary ex-
ercises of legislative power was developed in The Security of PrivaJe Propeny, 1 Ameri-
can Law Magazine 318, 334-47 (1843). 
76. See John V. Orth, Taking From A and Giving to B: Substantive Due Process 
and the Case of the Shifting Paradigm, 14 Const. Comm. 337 (1997). See, e.g., Bank of 
the Stale v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. 599, 606 (1831); Taylor, 4 Hill. at 146-47 (cited in note 71). 
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was likewise interpreted to em-
brace this principle. Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896) 
("The taking by a State of the private property of one person or corporation, without the 
owner's consent, for the private use of another, is not due process of law, and is a viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Article of Amendment of the Constitution of the United States."). 
A plurality of the Supreme Court has recently cited the shifting paradigm with approval. 
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Justice Joseph Story explained in Wilkinson v. Leland: "We 
know of no case, in which a legislative act to transfer the prop-
erty of A. to B. without his consent, has ever been held a consti-
tutional exercise of legislative power in any state in the Union."n 
This conclusion rested on the premise that individuals have cer-
tain rights, such as property ownership, which lawmakers cannot 
infringe regardless of any procedural considerations. 
In a closely related development, courts by the end of the 
eighteenth century employed the due process guarantee to cur-
tail the taking of property for public use without the payment of 
compensation. During the colonial era lawmakers had generally, 
but not invariably, respected the common law right to compensa-
tion when property was appropriated for public use.78 The tak-
ings clause of the Fifth Amendment, however, like the other 
provisions of the Bill of Rights, was not applicable to the states 
before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.79 Moreover, 
some initial state constitutions did not contain a takings clause. 
In such jurisdictions the authority of the state to appropriate 
property without any indemnity was called into question. 
At issue in Lindsay v. Commissioners&! was the power of city 
commissioners to open a street in Charleston across the com-
plainant's land. On a motion for a writ of prohibition to restrain 
the commissioners, the city attorney conceded that the legisla-
ture could not lawfully transfer private property from one per-
son to another. But he sought to distinguish the power to lay out 
roads for public use, and insisted that such exercise of eminent 
domain did not require compensation. Two judges agreed with 
this argument, taking the position that opening roads was an in-
herent aspect of sovereignty paramount to any private rights. 
More interesting for our purposes, however, was that two judges 
maintained that compensation was constitutionally mandated by 
the due process standard. Pointing to the law of the land clause 
in the South Carolina Constitution, Judge Thomas Waties em-
phasized that the law of the land did not mean any act that the 
legislature might pass. Rather, he asserted that this clause re-
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (quoting Justice Samuel Chase in Calder 
v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dallas) 386 (1798)). 
77. 27 U.S. (2 Peters) 627,658 (1829). 
78. James W. Ely, Jr., "That due satisfaction may be made": the Fifth Amendment 
and the Origins of the Compensation Principle, 36 Am. J. of Leg. Hist. I (1992). 
79. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Peters) 243 (1833). 
80. 2 Bay (S.C. 1796) 38. 
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ferred to "the ancient common law of the land. "81 Judge Waties 
therefore concluded that this language established as a constitu-
tional right the common law principle that owners were entitled 
to compensation when their property was taken. He added that 
"the right of property is held under the constitution, and not at 
the will of the legislature."82 
Lindsay was inconclusive because the court was equally di-
vided, but the opinion by Judge Waties treated the law of the 
land clause as placing substantive limitations on the legislature. 
It marked an important step toward the view that confiscation of 
property without compensation was a violation of due process. 
Other courts soon built upon Waties's insight, holding that it was 
beyond legislative competence to change or abolish vested prop-
erty rights unless an indemnity was paid. 
The most prominent decision in this regard was Gardner v. 
Village of Newburgh.83 Anxious to establish a water supply, the 
Village of Newburgh planned to divert a stream away from the 
plaintiffs farm. The governing statute made no provision for 
compensation, and the plaintiff sued for an injunction to prevent 
the diversion. Chancellor James Kent ruled that a riparian 
owner was entitled to use a watercourse flowing through his 
property. Kent then declared that an owner could not be de-
prived of property except by due process of law, which he de-
scribed as "an ancient and fundamental maxim of common right 
to be found in Magna Charta ... " and incorporated into New 
York's statutory bill of rights.84 He continued that payment of "a 
fair compensation" was an indispensable element in the exercise 
of eminent domain. In reaching this conclusion Kent relied 
upon "natural equity" and English common law. He cited the 
explicit takings clause in the Fifth Amendment and other state 
constitutions as declarations of "this great and sacred principle 
of private right. "85 
Other state courts echoed Kent's views, holding or strongly 
intimating that due process curtailed legislative authority by pre-
venting uncompensated confiscation of property. Some exam-
ples may be instructive. In 1834 the Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire, citing Gardner, declared that the state bill of rights 
81. Id. at 59. 
82. ld. 
83. 7 Am. Dec. 526 (N.Y. Ch. 1816). 
84. ld. at 528. 
85. ld. at 529-30. 
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"has always been understood necessarily to include, as a matter 
of right, and as one of the first principles of justice, the further 
limitation, that in case his property is taken without his consent, 
due compensation must be provided. "86 Three years later the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina analyzed the delegation of 
eminent domain to railroad companies. Discussing the import of 
the law of the land clause in the state constitution, Judge Ruffin 
observed: "it may also be true that the clause under considera-
tion is restrictive of the right of the public to the use of private 
property, and impliedly forbids it, without compensation."87 The 
Court stopped short of "a positive opinion" because the statute 
at issue provided for compensation. Yet Ruffin clearly treated 
compensation as a constitutional norm, and went on to state that 
it was "not deemed probable ... that the legislature will at any 
time take the property of the citizen for public use" without an 
indemnity.88 
The Supreme Court of Georgia followed suit in Parham v. 
Justices of the Inferior Court of Decatur County.89 Under a state 
statute a landowner was only entitled to compensation when a 
road was opened through enclosed property. There was no pro-
vision for compensation when a roadway was laid out across un-
enclosed or wild land. The court viewed Magna Carta as part of 
the law of the state. It interpreted the law of the land clause as 
affirming the common law rule that the legislature must award 
compensation when exercising eminent domain. Indeed, the 
court noted that legislative authority was limited by the state and 
federal constitutions, and "by certain great fundamental princi-
ples not embodied in either."90 Since the right of compensation 
was deemed to be one of these fundamental principles, the court 
enjoined the opening of the road over unenclosed land until an 
indemnity was paid. In a telling comment, the court observed: 
"The sacredness of private property ought not to be confided to 
the uncertain virtue of those who govern. "91 
86. Proprietors of the Piscataqua Bridge v. New Hampshire Bridge, 7 N.H. 35, 66 
(1834). 
87. Raleigh and Gaston Rail Road Co. v. Davis, 19 N.C. 451,461 (1837). 
88. ld. at 461. 
89. 9 Ga. 341 (1851). 
90. ld. at 355. 
91. ld. at 348. This antebellum line of cases foreshadowed the decision in Chicago, 
Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) that just compensa-
tion for property taken for public use was an essential element of due process as guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment. In reaching this conclusion Justice John M. Harlan 
cited Parham and Gardner. See generally James W. Ely, Jr., The Fuller Coun and Tak· 
ings Jurisprudence, 2 J. of Sup. Ct. Hist. 120 (1996). 
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As antebellum state courts were interpreting due process to 
restrain arbitrary deprivations of property, they also developed 
another substantive limit on legislative power-that due process 
mandated general, not special, laws.92 According to Blackstone, 
a law was "something permanent, uniform, and universal."93 It 
followed that particular legislation aimed at individuals or small 
groups was suspect because such laws were not general in appli-
cation. 
The Tennessee Supreme Court articulated this view in the 
important and widely cited case of Vanzant v. Wadde/.94 The 
matter before the court was legislation prescribing the manner in 
which note holders could recover judgments against certain 
state-chartered banks. In the course of his decision sustaining 
the validity of the measure, Judge John Catron considered at 
length the constitutional requirement for general laws: 
That a partial law, tending directly or indirectly to deprive a 
corporation or an individual of rights to property, or to the 
equal benefits of the general and public laws of the land, is 
unconstitutional and void, we do not doubt. *** Our consti-
tution, art. 11, sec. 8, declares, "That no free man shall be de-
prived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of 
his peers, or the law of the land." The clause "law of the 
land," means a general and public law, equally binding upon 
every member of the community. 
* * * 
The right to life, liberty and property, of every individual, 
must stand or fall by the same rule or law that governs every 
other member of the body politic, or "land," under similar 
circumstances; and every partial or private law, which directly 
proposes to destroy or affect individual rights, or does the 
same thing by affording remedies leading to similar conse-
quences, is unconstitutional and void. Were this otherwise, 
odious individuals and corporate bodies, would be governed 
by one rule, and the mass of the community who made the 
law, by another. The idea of a people through their represen-
tatives, making laws whereby are swept away the life, liberty 
and property of one or a few citizens, by which neither the 
representatives nor their other constituents are willing to be 
92. The development of equal treatment as an element of antebellum due process 
jurisprudence is examined in Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and 
Demise of Lochner Era Police Power Jurisprudence 50-55 (Duke U. Press, 1993). 
93. Blackstone, 1 Commentaries at 44 (cited in note 36). 
94. 10 Tenn. 260 (1829). 
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bound, is too odious to be tolerated in any government where 
freedom has a name. Such abuses resulted in the adoption of 
Magna Charta in England, securing the subject against odious 
exceptions which is, and for centuries has been, the founda-
tion of English liberty. Its infraction was a leading cause why 
we separated from that country, and its value as a fundamen-
tal rule for the protection of the citizen against legislative 
usurpation, was the reason of its adoption as part of our con-
stitution.95 
337 
This passage reflected the central tenet of Jacksonian De-
mocracy-equal rights for all, special privileges for none. Ca-
tron perceived that the property and liberty of individuals were 
threatened by governmental favoritism or hostility. The remedy 
for this evil was to insist that legislators act through general laws 
binding on the whole community. In this manner, Catron sought 
to safeguard the rights of individuals by requiring that laws be 
generally applicable and not single out politically vulnerable 
groups for disparate treatment. 
The Tennessee Supreme Court further amplified its analysis 
of the law of the land clause in Bank of the State v. Cooper.96 
The judges, each writing a separate opinion, struck down a stat-
ute that created a special tribunal to resolve suits against officers 
of the state bank. Although the judges found several constitu-
tional infirmities, they focused much of their attention on the 
need to protect individuals from legislative abuse. Speaking of 
the law of the land clause, Judge Nathan Green asked: 
Does it not seem conclusive then, that this provision was in-
tended to restrain the legislature from enacting any law af-
fecting injuriously the rights of any citizen, unless at the same 
time, the rights of all others in similar circumstances were 
equally affected by it. If the law be general in its operation, 
affecting all alike, the minority are safe, because the majority, 
who make the law, are operated on by it equally with the oth-
ers. Here is the importance of the provision, and the great se-
curity it affords.97 
A number of other state courts during the antebellum era 
also invoked the concept of due process to condemn partial or 
class legislation, that is, laws which conferred special benefits or 
imposed unique burdens rather than promoting the broad public 
95. Id. at 269-71. 
96. 10 Tenn. 599 (1831). 
97. Id. at 606-607. 
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good. For instance, the Supreme Court of Texas asserted: "'laws 
of the land' ... are now, in their most usual acceptation, re-
garded as general public laws, binding all the members of the 
community under similar circumstances, and not partial or pri-
vate laws, affecting the rights of private individuals, or classes of 
individuals. "98 By establishing equal treatment as a constitu-
tional norm, this line of cases curtailed the power of legislatures 
to enact laws which aided one class of individuals. Michael Les 
Benedict has cogently pointed out that "antebellum American 
law was suffused with the principle that special legislation was 
illegitimate, and that conviction had already been linked to the 
fundamental maxim that no person could be deprived of prop-
erty but by due process of law or by the laws of the land. "99 
Thus, if an exercise of legislative authority was not general in 
application then it failed to satisfy due process. 
For this constitutional norm to have any effect, however, 
courts had to see through the ostensible rationale for legislation. 
Due process, in other words, called for careful judicial scrutiny 
of the purpose of legislation and the means employed to achieve 
stated objectives. 
DUE PROCESS AND REGULATION 
As different elements of substantive due process review 
evolved before the Civil War, the antebellum prohibition 
movement posed new legal issues and set the stage for courts to 
enlarge due process protection of property ownership. By the 
mid-1850s a number of states turned to legal means in an effort 
to eliminate alcohol from American society.100 In 1855, for ex-
ample, the New York legislature declared alcoholic beverages to 
be a nuisance, restricted possession of alcohol, made it unlawful 
to sell liquor, and authorized summary destruction of such bev-
erages. In the landmark case of Wynehamer v. People101 the de-
fendant was convicted and fined for selling liquor in violation of 
the statute. Previously, courts had found due process violations 
where laws deprived individuals of property or took it for public 
use without compensation. In contrast, Wynehamer involved a 
98. Janes v. Reynold's Administration, 2 Tex. 250,252 (1847). 
99. Benedict, 3 L. & Hist. Rev. at 326 (cited in note 56). 
I 00. Ian R. Tyrrell, Sobering Up: From Temperance to Prohibition in Antebellum 
American, 1800-1860 at 252-60 (Greenwood Press, 1979); Thomas R. Pegram, Banting 
Demon Rum: The Struggle for a Dry America, 1800-1933 at 38-42 (Ivan R. Dee, 1998). 
101. 13 N.Y. 378 (1856). 
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general regulatory measure which attempted to suppress a par-
ticular type of property to achieve the social goals of alleviating 
intemperance and pauperism. 
A divided court in Wynehamer found that the act consti-
tuted a deprivation of property without due process with respect 
to liquor already owned when the measure took effect. The 
judges each wrote separate opinions, and several provided a 
searching analysis of the meaning of due process. Rather than 
treat the opinions individually, I shall set forth the main points 
advanced by the judges in the majority. They first emphasized 
that alcoholic beverages had long been regarded as property, 
and represented an important article of commerce. Next the 
judges defined property expansively. Ownership of property en-
tailed more than physical possession of an object. As Judge Al-
exander S. Johnson explained: 
Property is the right of any person to possess, use, enjoy and 
dispose of a thing. The term, although frequently applied to 
the thing itself, in strictness means only the rights of the 
owner in relation to it. [citation omitted] A man may be de-
prived of his property in a chattel, therefore, without its being 
seized or physically destroyed, or taken from his possession. 
Whatever subverts his rights, in regard to it, annihilates his 
property in it. It follows, that a law which should provide in 
regard to any article in which a right of property is recog-
nized, that it should neither be sold or used, nor kept in any 
place whatsoever within this state, would fall directly within 
the letter of the constitutional inhibition; as it would in the 
most effectual manner possible deprive the owner of his 
property, without the interposition of any court or the use of 
any process whatever.102 
Judge George F. Comstock similarly declared that he could 
not find "any definition of property which does not include the 
power of disposition and sale, as well as the right of private use 
and enjoyment."103 It was then an easy step to conclude that leg-
islation which banned the sale of liquor effectively destroyed its 
value. 
The majority traced the due process concept to Magna 
Carta. Whereas in Great Britain the principles of Magna Carta 
restrained only the Crown, Judge Comstock pointed out: "With 
us they are imposed by the people as restraints upon the power 
102. ld. at 433-34. 
103. Id. at 396. 
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of the legislature."104 He emphatically rejected the notion that 
due process of law was satisfied by any duly enacted legislation. 
Rather, Judge Comstock maintained: 
The true interpretation of these constitutional phrases is, that 
where rights are acquired by the citizen under the existing 
law, there is no power in any branch of the government to 
take them away; but where they are held contrary to the ex-
isting law, or are forfeited by its violation, then they may be 
taken from him-not by an act of the legislature, but in the 
due administration of the law itself, before the judicial tribu-
nals of the state. The cause or occasion for depriving the citi-
zen of his supposed rights must be found in the law as it is, or, 
at least it cannot be created by a legislative act which aims at 
their destruction. Where rights of property are admitted to 
exist, the legislature cannot say they shall exist no longer; nor 
will it make any difference, although a process and a tribunal 
are appointed to execute the sentence. If this is the "law of 
the land," and "due process of law," within the meaning of the 
constitution, then the legislature is omnipotent. It may, under 
the same interpretation, pass a law to take away liberty or life 
without a preexisting cause, appointing judicial and executive 
agencies to execute its will. Property is placed gy the consti-
tution in the same category with liberty and life. 1 
Two points made by Comstock bear emphasis. Under his 
analysis, the legislature could not eliminate existing property 
rights by a general law abolishing a particular type of property. 
Moreover, consistent with the views of the framers, he equated 
constitutional protection of property and liberty. 
Of course, the judges in the majority were careful to point 
out that lawmakers were empowered to attack "the evils of 
drunkenness" by appropriate regulation. "All regulations of 
trade, with a view to the public interests, may more or less im-
pair the value of property," Judge Johnson stated, "but they do 
not come within the constitutional inhibition, unless they virtu-
ally take away and destroy those rights in which property con-
sists .... "106 In short, general regulations might so limit the en-
joyment of property as to effectuate a deprivation of property 
without due process. This approach necessitated judicial scru-
tiny as to the degree of regulation and its impact on individual 
104. Id. at 392. Other courts also stressed that due process safeguarded liberty as 
well as property. Taylor, 4 Hill. at 147. 
105. Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 393. 
106. ld. at435. 
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owners. There was no easy formula for determining a violation 
of due process. Judge Comstock tellingly observed "that be-
tween regulation and destruction there is somewhere, however 
difficult to define with precision, a line of separation."un The 
majority was persuaded that this line was crossed by a law which 
in effect compelled the destruction of already acquired property 
rights in liquor. Several judges suggested, however, that the leg-
islature could prohibit future importation or manufacture of al-
coholic beverages. 
Three judges dissented, arguing that the conviction of the 
defendant should be affirmed. They adopted a narrow view of 
property for purposes of due process analysis. Thus, Judge 
Thomas A. Johnson asserted that the due process clause did not 
apply where the value of property was diminished by regulation. 
Deprivation of property, he declared, was confined to the di-
vestment of legal title and not to restrictions on trade.11)1 There-
fore, nothing in the state constitution prevented the legislature 
from outlawing traffic in liquor. 
The Wynehamer case was the most significant invocation of 
the substantive component of due process by a state court in the 
antebellum era. "This decision," according to one authority, 
"was recognized as epoch-making almost as soon as it was ren-
dered."ul9 For the first time a court invalidated a far-reaching 
regulatory statute on due process grounds. To be sure, most 
antebellum courts sustained prohibition statutes in the face of 
due process challenges.110 Yet the underlying principle in Wyne-
hamer that due process entailed substantive limits on legislative 
power gained ground on the eve of the Civil War. 
Critics of substantive due process have had a difficult time 
dealing with Wynehamer. Some, such as Bork and Frank H. 
Easterbrook, simply ignore it. Corwin and Lowell L. Howe have 
endeavored to dismiss the case as singular, but they are guilty of 
overarguing the evidence. 111 The fact that most state courts up-
held prohibition statutes does not demonstrate that they rejected 
107. Id. at 399. 
108. ld. at~-
109. Mott, Due Process of Law at 318 (cited in note 23). Mott also observed that the 
"modem concept of due process of law may be said to have had its origin" in Wyneha-
mer. Id. at 317. 
110. Id. at 319-26; Tyrrell, Sobering Up at 290-92 (cited in note 100} (discussing the 
impact of court decisions on prohibition laws). 
Ill. Corwin, 24 Harv. L. Rev. at 471-75 (cited in note 53); Howe, 18 Calif. L. Rev. at 
600-07 (cited in note 53). 
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the use of due process to impose substantive restraints on law-
making. 
THE COOLEY SYNTHESIS 
As this historical review chronicles, antebellum state courts 
relied on due process to curtail governmental power in a variety 
of situations. Earl M. Maltz has aptly concluded: "A substantial 
number of states . . . also imbued their respective due process 
clauses with a substantive content."112 My argument is not that 
all judges accepted the emerging notion of substantive due proc-
ess. Some continued to view due process solely in procedural 
terms.113 The key point, however, is that before the Civil War 
many courts were fashioning substantive protections from the 
due process concept. It remained only for a theorist to weave 
together the diverse strands of the evolving substantive due pro-
cess and present the doctrine in a compelling fashion. 
Thomas M. Cooley, the most influential constitutional 
writer of the late nineteenth century, embraced a substantive 
understanding of due process in his landmark work, A Treatise 
on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Ugon the Legisla-
tive Power of the States of the American Union. 4 A Jacksonian 
Democrat, Cooley linked the Jacksonian principles of equal 
rights and hostility to special economic privileges with due proc-
ess protection of property rights. He explained that due process 
was intended to safeguard individuals from the arbitrary exercise 
of governmental power. Declaring that the language "law of the 
land" and "due process of law," found in state constitutions, had 
the same meaning, Cooley analyzed at length due process pro-
112. Earl M. Maltz, Founeenth Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 Am. 
J. of Leg. Hist. 305,317 (1988). See also Michael W. Dowdle, Note, The Descent of Anti-
discrimination: On the Intellectual Origins of the Current Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 
66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1165, 1184-86 (1991). 
113. E.g., Brown v Hummel, 6 Pa. 86, 91 (1847) (holding that person could not be 
deprived of property by legislative action without trial by due course of law); Fisher v 
McGirr, 67 Mass. 1, 36-41 (1854) (equating due process with procedural safeguards); 
Rhinehan v Schuyler, 7 Ill. 473, 518-21 (1845) (law of land clause in state constitution 
construed to mean that criminal trials should be conducted according to common law); 
Leonard W. Levy, The Law of the Commonwealth and Chief Justice Shaw 261-65 (Har-
vard U. Press, 1957) (asserting that Chief Justice Shaw rejected a substantive interpreta-
tion of due process); Howard, The Road from Runnymede at 305 (cited in note 22) (ob-
serving that antebellum courts "typically had in mind procedural requirements that 
legislatures were obliged to honor"). 
114. (Little, Brown and Co., 1868). 
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tection of property rights. He maintained that "a legislative en-
actment is not necessarily the law of the land. "115 
This interpretation raised the question of what criteria 
should be employed as a constitutional benchmark when legisla-
tion was challenged on due process grounds. As Cooley saw it: 
When the government, through its established agencies, inter-
feres with the title to one's property, or with his independent 
enjoyment of it, and its act is called in question as not in ac-
cordance with the law of the land, we are to test its validity by 
those principles of civil liberty and constitutional defence 
which have become established in our system of law, and not 
by any rules that pertain to forms of procedure merely .... 
Due process of law in each particular case means, such an ex-
ertion of the powers of government as the settled maxims of 
law sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of 
individual rights as those maxims prescribe for the class of 
cases to which the one in question belongs.116 
Cooley obviously believed that due process meant more than 
proper procedure. A valid statute had to be congruent with the 
fundamental values inherent in the American constitutional sys-
tem. 
Drawing upon the evolving due process jurisprudence in the 
state courts, Cooley identified several due process restraints on 
legislative authority. He noted the necessity to pay compensa-
tion when property was taken for public use, and flatly declared 
that "there is no rule or principle known to our system" under 
which property could be transferred from one private party to 
another.117 Cooley took particular aim at class legislation. He 
urged governance by generally applicable rules as a constitu-
tional maxim, and decried special favors to individuals or groups. 
Thus, Cooley observed: 
Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably 
should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are 
granted, or special burdens or restrictions imposed in any 
case, it must be presumed that the legislature designed to de-
part as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of gov-
ernment. The State, it is to be presumed, has no favors to be-
stow, and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. 
Special privileges are obnoxious, and discriminations against 
115. ld. at 354. 
116. Id. at 356. 
117. Id. at 357. 
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persons or classes are still more so, and as a rule of construc-
tion are always to be leaned against as probably not contem-
plated or designed. 118 
These comments should not be confused with current equal pro-
tection clause analysis. Rather, Cooley maintained that legisla-
tion must be evenhanded and not favor one group at the expense 
of others. 
Cooley did much to shape the intellectual and legal envi-
ronment of late nineteenth century America. Although a treat-
ment of his influence is beyond the scope of this paper, Cooley 
was instrumental in paving the way for a broad interpretation of 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.119 He also 
helped to focus substantive due process review on the evils of 
class legislation as a threat to constitutional liberty. Cooley, 
then, provided a vital link between the antebellum notion of 
substantive due process and the development of this doctrine in 
the late nineteenth century. 
DUE PROCESS IN ANTEBELLUM CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY 
Historians have tended to ignore the evolution of substan-
tive due process before the Civil War, or to dismiss it as inconse-
quential. I suggest that this approach is untenable, and badly 
distorts our comprehension of evolving conceptions of due proc-
ess. Critics, from Corwin to Bork, appear to have been animated 
by their disagreement with particular applications of the doc-
trine. They naturally downplayed evidence showing the long 
lineage of the substantive reading of due process, and wrongly 
accused judges of simply inventing the doctrine as a vehicle to 
impose their own views of public policy. 
An examination of the record establishes that antebellum 
courts, drawing upon an understanding of due process as having 
both substantive and procedural content, began to fashion sev-
eral tenets which limited legislative authority: 
118. Id. at 393. 
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1) That the vested property interests of one person could not 
be transferred to another, even upon payment of compensa-
tion; 
2) That, despite the absence of an express just compensation 
provision in some state constitutions, private property could 
not be taken for public use without compensation; 
3) That legislation must be public in nature and confer bene-
fits and burdens equally. 
345 
In other words, courts before the Civil War were increasingly 
seeing due process as a substantive protection for vested prop-
erty rights and as a guarantee against class legislation. Due pro-
cess, then, helped mark the bounds of legitimate government. 
Even recognizing the historical basis for substantive due 
process, other issues remain to be addressed. How does one de-
termine the appropriate standard by which to ascertain whether 
legislation violates due process? How are "liberty" and "prop-
erty" defined for purposes of due process protection?1~ The 
antebellum cases contain the seeds of an answer to these ques-
tions, but the courts had little occasion to explore these issues in 
depth. It should be clear, however, that antebellum courts did 
not just concoct the doctrine of substantive due process out of 
the air. Instead, they drew upon a herita~e of liberty fim:tly fixed 
in the matrix of American legal thought.1 1 
120. Robinson, Evolving Conceptions of 'Property' and 'Libeny,' at 84-85 (cited in 
note 56). 
121. Archibald Cox, The Court and the Constitution 122 (Houghton Mifflin Co., 
1987) (rejecting the position that due process only entailed fair procedures, and stating: 
"American jurists, with a few exceptions, have always accepted the view that the concept 
of due process of law, like the words 'the law of the land' in Magna Carta, puts some lib-
erties and some property interests beyond the power of government .... "). See also 
Keynes, Liberty, Property, and Privacy at 24-30 (cited in note 24). 
